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IN Till: SllPRnrr: C:Olllff
OF Tl!L STi\TI'. OF llT:\11

ROHERT L. CRIMMINS and
ROCF CPIW1NS,
Pl2intiffs-Respondents,
vs.

Case N::i.

17186

~HCHJ\FL

SIMO"JDS WH.l
BARBARA SIMONDS,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATIJRE OF TIIE CASE
Respondents filed an action for a permanent injw1ction to enjoin the
operation of a beauty parlor by Appellants, basing their claim upcm a
restrictive covenant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
J\fter a bench trial, the District Court granted judgment in favor of
Respondents permanently enjoining the operation of Appellants' beauty parlor
on Appellants premises.
RELIEF SOUQ-IT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek a reversal of the trial court's judgment and a ruling that
the restrictive covenant is void and unenforceable.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents do not dispute Appellants Statement of Facts as set forth in
the first four paragraphs of Appellants Brief.

Ho1vever, Appellants statement
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as to what George Buzianis stt'stifinl to at trial is misleading.

Although

11

is correct that George Bnzianis test ifiL'c 1 th~it he 01•erated a real estate busu"
in his residence, what Appellants failed to mcnt ion is that George Buzianis
further testified that his residP1h

c·

is located at NLDnber 36, Benchmark \'it1:i,,

Subdivision, 300 feet away from Respondents property 1 ine (outside and not a
part of the Upland Terrace Subdivision in question).

Further, Ceorge Bu:iJiii·

I

did not testify that four or five businesses were in operation 1vithin the suh· I
division close to Plaintiffs' residence.

What he in fact testified to was that·

he knows"of four or five businesses within a couple of blocks of our entry" an;,
that "they are in the Upland Terrace" which consists of several subdivisions.
There is "A", "B", "C", and"D".
beauty

par~ors,

j

He further testified that "I am aware of three

one real estate office, are the ones that I am aware of" :md t:

they are mostly in subdivisions "C" and "A".

(Tr. ,pp. 113-117).

What

further failed to mention is that George Buzianis testified that to his

Appell~<i

knmile::
i

there are no commercial structures anywhere in Upland Terrace Subdivision, Plat
"C" and that any businesses were in homes.

It is correct, as Appellants state in paragraph 6 of Appellants' StatemEr'. !
I

of Facts, that Plaintiff Rose Crimmins testified on cross-examination that she
had her hau done by Defendant Barbara Simonds prior to the commencement of the
instant ac':ion.

However, what the Appellants failed to state is that on rediri.:

examination, Plaintiff Rose Crimmins testified that this was done long before
Defendant Barbara Simonds opened her beauty shop and perfonned a business out·
her home.

(Tr., pp. 144-151).

Al though it is correct that the Defendant, Barbara Simonds that she inJ'
actual knowledge of the restrictive covenant prior to being notified by ~!rs.
Crimmins, as set forth in the final paragraph of :\ppcllants' Statement of Fie:·
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!

it is important to note that the trial court found that the Defend;rnts-Appellants,

had constructive not ice of the restrictive covemnts at the time they purchased
the property and that they would be batmd by them. (Tr., p. 188).
ARL.Ufi'.NT
POINT I
1llf TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY Hllf.L:O
IN REFUSING TO VOID Till'. COVl'N.l\Nf
IN QUESTION AND IN RITUSJN(; TO
VALIDATE Tf!E MODIFICATION 1\CRl'.EHENT

Defendants-Appellants incorrectly cite the case of
~._ __v. Sin~,

14 Utah 2nd 36, 376 P. 2d 940 (1962).

~~~opolitan

Investment

The Plaintiff, and not the

Defendant as in the present case, brought action to invalidate a restrictive
covenant which stated that the property could not be used for the erection of
a motel thereon.

The District Court ruled for the Plaintiff and the Defendants

appealed.
The Supreme Court of Utah ruled that the findings of the lower court invalidating the restrictive covenant were clearly against the weight of the
evidence.

The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the District Court deciding

that the restrictive covenant was valid.
Defendants-Appellants cite the case of Hayes v. Gibbs, 169 P.2d 781 (Utah
1946).

In that case the Supreme Court of Utah, upholding a restrictive covenant,

came to the following conclusion:
That if the general plan has been maintained
from its inception, if i' has been understood,
accepted, rebed on, and acted upon by all in
interest, it is binding and enforceable on all.
It goes with the land, an<l is equally binding
on all purchasers with notice. 169 P. 2d At 784.
It is undisputed that the area is residential in character.

Plaintiffs

Robert and Rose Crimmins bought a home relying on this very fact with the notice
that the area was subject to a restrictive covenant.

The trial court concluded
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that the Defendants, as well as the Plaintiff:;, had constructive notice of
those restrictive covenants at the

t

i111c the\' purch;1:;cd tlwi r propert1' aiid , 0

they would be hound by them. (Tr., p. 188).
Defendants-Appellants cite the case of lk'L'l1t __ \l_·~St<:-]_l,h<,'l1:i,

~Ll:J k11 1 SS<1,

464 P. 2d 258 (1970), which sets forth the f:ictors to he conside1·ed in deter

mining whether a neighborhood has changed suffiL·icntly to \\';1rrant voiding a
restrictive covenant.

In l!':'._t:_i_I!_, the lower court :;pccifically found tlwrc

had been mnnerous violations of the restrict i\e covenants and concluded that
the viol at ions had been so general and subs Lill t i a I as to ind i c1 t e ;1 purpo'''
and intention of the residents of the area to ;diandon the general

buildi11~

plan or sc!1eme.
In Hecht_, the Supreme Court of

~:111sas

in ,lc'ciding lihcthcr injunctil'c

relief would be granted to restni in the violation of restrictive co\'enants,
stated it is a matter with in the sound discretion of the trial court to be
determined in the light of all the facts ancl circrnnstances.

Absent manifest

abuse of that discretion, the Appellate Court will not interfere. %4 P.:d

)<

In the present case, the trial court found that two or three busine>ses
were in violation of the restrictive covenants.

The other businesses, the

trial court noted, were not businesses but the nonnal aspccts of running
a home and neighborly life.

The trial cow

t

concluded that the area had not

changed in its character and is still residential, not business (Tr. pp. 18'1-i'
POINT II
THE TRIAL C:ClJRT CORRECTLY APPLIED THF
IXXTRINE OF BALAJ\ONG OF Tl-IE EQUITIES

The last case

Defendants-~ppellants

cite is

l'_~a~1ikolas _Broth~~rs

~nterpri~~5-!.· Sugarhouse ShoppingJ::,c;_nter ,~_ss<J_ciatt'_~, 535 P. 2d 1256 (IJtJh,l'i°
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l

In P_apanikola~, the Utah Supreme Court L-011,;idcn·d the issue,; of covenant
validity versus changed conditions and the a111higuitv of the covenant.
upheld the validity of the restrictive cove11;1nt Lleciding there 1<ere no

The Court
changed

conditions and that there was no amhi gu it y in the re,;t r ict i ve covenant.
In th2 present case, the trial court fu1md th:1t the character of the
property is still residential and that the covenant,; a1·e not :u11ihguous. rrr.
pp. 189-190).
In Papanikolas, the Utah Supreme Court applied the "balancing of injury
test". The Court held that the Defendants wilfully and intentional]\· encroached
upon the parking easement.

The Court concluded that there is no basis to find

an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in ordering its removal".
535 P. Zd

ci+_

1259.

In t:1e present case, the trial court applied the doctrine of "balancing
of injuries" stating "that it is regretful that the Defendants have expended
the money that they have as far as building the beauty parlor and improving their
premises for that operation". (Tr. p. 140).
In the recent case of Leaver ~Grose, 610 P. 2d 1262, (Utah, Apri 1,
1980), the facts are similiar to the instant case.

Defendant brought action

claiming t!1c restrictive covenants were unenforceable and seeking to invalidate
them.

The Supreme Court of Utah, in ~eaver, stated:
Plainly and simply stated, Defendants untenable
position was occassioned by her own action and
there is no basis in eqiuty to shift the responsibility therefore, to the plaintiffs. Defendant
and plaint 1 ffs obviously had a Ji fference of
opinion as to the enforceability of the restrictive
covenants. At the outset (i.e. from the time she
was able to obtain a building permit), Defendant
convinced herself that the restrictive covenants
were unenforceable
Plaintiffs promptly objected
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I

I

to her remodeling project in July, and ag<!in
in September, at which time Defendants attention
was specifically drawn to the covenants in question.
Then being faced with a controversy as to the enforceability of the restrictive covenants, Defendant
agreed to cease construction until she could check the
matter further. However, the validity of the legal
position she had previously chosen, for she res~ned
the remodeling project. In doing so, we can only
conclude that she totally discounted the merits of
plaintiffs objections to the project, or that she
took a calculated risk that plaintiffs would not
seek a judicial determination of the issues, or, if
they did that they would not achieve success. Thus
it is to be seen that it was not plaintiffs actions,
or inactions, which induced defendants to proceed
with the project but her own erroneous legal conclusion that the restrictive covenants were no
longer enforecable. 610 P. Zd Ut. 1264.
In the present case, Defendants-Appellants were notifeid by Plaintiffs· t
Respondents that they were in violation of the restrictive covena11ts.

In spite I

of this, D£fendants-Appellants proceeded to circulate a petition trying to modi;,:
the restrictive covenants.

Since it was the Defendants own erroneous conclusic·

that the restrictive covenants were unenforceable, they should assLD11e respons1·
bility of the expenditures they made on the beauty parlor.
CQ]l[;LUS ION

Plaintiffs-Respondents respectfully request that this Court deny Defendan,J
Appellants appeal and affirm the judgment of the trial court upholding the
restrictive covenant.
DATED IBIS

~day

of

j)~,

1980.

Respectfully submitted,
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lTRTIFICl\TF OF
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nm copies of the

I, the undersigned, herehy certify that I mailed

foregoing grief of Respondents to J. Franklin l\llred, 321 South Sixth East,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, postage prepaid, this,,;_,/day of Decemher, 1980.
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